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Abstract
The relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and earnings management (EM) has only emerged
recently as a topic of academic research. Literature suggests that firms may strategically use CSR to compensate for
EM or to deflect stakeholder attention from EM. Studies on the EM-CSR relationships have so far yielded contradictory
results. Additionally, research has largely neglected the influence of industry on this relationship. As scholars of both
CSR and EM have suggested that industry effects may play a role, this study examines the relationship between the
level of CSR performance of companies, the extent of EM firms are practising and the effect of industry (high vs. low
environmental impact as a proxy for experienced stakeholder pressure). Using the Modified Jones model, discretionary
accruals are estimated and used as a proxy for EM (accrual-based EM). Firm CSR performance is captured by using the
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domino (KLD) database. Using a sample consisting of 5494 observations of US listed companies for
the fiscal years 2003 until 2009, this study (1) finds no relationship between EM and CSR and (2) finds that the firms in
the category high environmental impact do not seem to practice EM but do display higher levels of CSR performance.
Finally, the article reflects critically on the concepts used in studying the EM-CSR relationship and its contribution to the
literature.
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, Earnings management, Sustainability, Quantitative analysis, Modified Jones
model, Discretionary accruals
Introduction1
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to a wide
range of actions taken by firms to reduce their negative
and increase their positive impacts on society (both in
an ecological and a social sense) (cf. Carroll 1999).
Stakeholder concerns and ethical issues (e.g., wellbeing
of employees, the communities firms operate in, labour
conditions in the supply chain, experienced product
quality by customers, and transparency) as well as eco-
nomic aspects (e.g., the costs incurred by and revenues
generated through addressing societal impacts) represent
an integral part of the CSR concept (Dahlsrud 2008).
Hence, the disclosure of reliable and timely financial
information is arguably an important aspect of CSR. It
provides a basis of trust and confidence regarding the
firm’s claims, operations and future viability in its rela-
tionships with financial and non-financial stakeholders
(Yip et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2012). However, firms have
been reported to engage in earnings management (EM)
to obfuscate rather than reveal their true financial char-
acteristics (Gaver et al., 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev
1997; Vinten et al. 2005). EM occurs when managers use
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring trans-
actions to alter financial reports, either to mislead stake-
holders about the underlying economic performance of
the firm or to influence contractual outcomes that
depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy and
Wahlen 1999). EM essentially has a negative influence
on the quality of financial information as it portrays a
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false image towards different stakeholders of the firm’s
earnings (Prior et al. 2008).
The EM-CSR relationship has only emerged as a topic
of academic research rather recently and similar studies
have yielded different conclusions on this relationship.
On the one hand, findings shows that CSR-oriented
firms provide more transparent financial information as
a result of managers willing to behave more ethically
and meeting expectations of society and stakeholders.
On the other hand, studies confirm that firms that invest
in CSR practices show high levels of EM because man-
agers try to disguise the low quality of firms’ financial
statements through signalling higher levels of CSR. This
deflects stakeholder attention from the poor quality of
the earnings of the company towards the CSR perform-
ance of the company, helping managers to legitimize the
firm and themselves.
Despite the fact that industry effects have been recog-
nized by scholars as a topic of investigation in both the
separate contexts of EM and CSR, the emerging litera-
ture on the EM-CSR relationship has largely neglected
such effects. This particularly applies to the aspect of
negative environmental impacts of industries. However,
following the suggestions of Prior et al. (2008) and
Hrasky (2011), the extent to which firms within different
industries experience stakeholder pressure to address
their social and environmental responsibilities may well
influence the EM-CSR relationship.
Using the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) to
estimate discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM and the
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domino (KLD) database to measure
CSR performance, this article investigates the EM-CSR re-
lationship and the effect of industry type by distinguishing
between high and low environmental impact on this rela-
tionship. It reports on findings from analyzing financial
data from the COMPUSTAT database for one or more of
the fiscal years 2003 until 2009 of US listed companies,
comprising a total of 5494 observations. As such, this
study aims to make a contribution to the existing and em-
pirically inconclusive academic literature on the relation-
ship between earnings management and CSR.
The article starts with briefly defining EM, addressing
motivations for and implications of EM. Second, it turns
to the relationship between EM and CSR, highlighting
the scarce literature on this intersection that is currently
available. It then expounds on the research methodology
and presents the results. Finally, it discusses the findings
in the light of the existing literature and formulates
several avenues for future research.
Earnings management: definitions, motivation
and implications
The main function of financial statements is to provide
relevant and timely information about the financial
position of a firm that is useful to a wide range of stake-
holders in making economic decisions. It provides
stakeholders with a basis of trust and confidence regard-
ing a firm’s claims, current operations and future viabil-
ity. However, as various corporate scandals in recent
history have shown, financial information communicated
by firms is not necessarily reliable. Firms’ earnings
quality, understood as the congruence between the
information financial reports provide about their
performance and their actual performance, arguably
varies (Dechow et al. 2010).
EM is seen as the opposite of earnings quality and can
be defined as the extent to which managers exercise their
discretion over accounting numbers, thereby deliberately
aiming to alter financial reports to mislead stakeholders
about the firm’s underlying financial performance or to in-
fluence contractual outcomes (Watts and Zimmerman
1978; Healy and Wahlen 1999). Schipper (1989: 92)
defines earnings management as the “purposeful interven-
tion in the external financial reporting process, with the
intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say,
merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process).”
A well-known manifestation of EM is income smoothing,
through which firms aim to “dampen fluctuations of the
firms publicly reported net income” (Trueman and
Titman, 1988: 127). Empirical research has shown that
managing away decreases and losses in earnings are far
from uncommon in business (e.g., Gaver et al., 1995;
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Beatty et al., 2002;
Vinten et al. 2005).
As a general motivation, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)
contend that managers engage in EM to limit the costs
imposed on the firm in its transactions with stakeholders.
Healy and Wahlen (1999) distinguish between capital
market, contracting and regulatory motivations for man-
agers to engage in such practices. More specific reasons
for EM include attracting external financing at a lower
cost (Richardson et al. 2002), supporting negotiations with
trade unions (Liberty and Zimmerman 1986), and achieve
management targets to seize bonuses (Bergstresser and
Philippon, 2006).2
Generally, managers can adopt two main methods to
manipulate earnings, both opportunistic in nature: accrual-
based EM and real EM (Cohen et al. 2008). Accrual-based
EM means that managers change the accrual part of earn-
ings while not inducing real economic consequences
(Dechow et al. 2010). In contrast, real EM means that
companies actually modify their business actions, thus in-
ducing real economic consequences (Roychowdhury 2006).
EM thus is a strategy for obfuscating a firm’s true
financial quality (Courtis, 1998; Rutherford 2003) and, as
such, morally questionable from a CSR perspective.
From a theoretical perspective, EM can be primarily
seen as an agency dilemma, since managers (agents) are
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able to make decisions on behalf of shareholders and
other stakeholders (principals) that may be based on man-
agers’ self-interest rather than that of the company. EM
hence creates and exacerbates agency costs, because
stakeholders can be diluted by the reported financial infor-
mation possibly resulting in sub-optimal decision-making
and compromising their own interests. Various studies on
the agency costs of EM have found that EM has long-
term negative consequences for the firm and its share-
holders and for its stakeholders (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006;
Sloan 1996; D’Souza et al. 2000; Davidson III et al., 2004).
Earnings management and CSR
Although Watts and Zimmerman (1978) already argued
several decades ago that firms may reduce ‘political
costs’ by selecting accounting procedures that minimize
reported earnings, research into the EM-CSR relation-
ship has only begun to emerge. Although not covering
all the papers on the EM-CSR relationship cited in this
article, a recent overview study of Huang & Watson
(2015) on CSR research in 13 top accounting journals
serves as an illustration: it only mentions two papers
that directly and two papers that indirectly investigate
the EM-CSR relationship. We find this observation ra-
ther surprising, since the essence of EM (i.e., strategic-
ally obfuscating a firm’s quality to manipulate
stakeholder judgment) strongly resonates with the con-
temporary research theme of greenwashing and the
credibility of corporate CSR claims (e.g., Delmas and
Cuerel Burbano 2011; Elving, 2012; Illia et al., 2013; De
Vries et al. 2015). In addition, and as recognized in aca-
demic literature, CSR may be an ideal way to compen-
sate or deflect the attention of stakeholders for EM
(Prior et al. 2008). Kaplan (2001) in this regards states
that an important part of being socially responsible is
business ethics and that EM is generally seen as an uneth-
ical practice. Studying the EM-CSR relationship may fur-
ther be seen as a fruitful line of research within the
ongoing convergence between the disciplines of accounting
and CSR/sustainability, which is, for instance, illustrated by
the interest in firms’ integrated reporting practices and so-
cial and environmental accounting, true cost or true price
accounting approaches and discussions on the links be-
tween corporate and societal value creation (cf. Tilt, 2009;
KPMG 2014; Bebbington et al. 2014). There also seems to
be theoretical overlap in frameworks that can explain earn-
ings management and CSR practices as well as their
relationships, including agency theory, signalling theory,
and stakeholder-legitimacy theory (Sun et al. 2010).
Research on the EM-CSR relationship
To the extent that scholars have investigated the EM-
CSR relationship, their studies have yielded different
conclusions on this relationship, even when using the
same datasets. Research has focused on the extent and
nature of the EM-CSR relationship, using varying sample
sizes, sample sources, timeframes, geographies and prox-
ies used for EM and CSR (see Table 1).
Prior et al. (2008) investigated the proposition that
managers compromise stakeholder interests through EM
in order to obtain private benefits and compensate
stakeholders through CSR activities, hence assuming a
positive correlation between EM and CSR. Researching
593 firms from 26 countries, the authors indeed find EM
to have a positive impact on CSR, with the latter provid-
ing avenues for managerial entrenchment. Through ini-
tiating CSR activities, the authors contend, managers
can deal with stakeholders responding with activism
and vigilance to EM and secure their position in the
firm. This relationship holds for different forms of EM
Table 1 Overview of current literature on the EM-CSR relationship
Authors Year Nature of EM-
CSR relationship
Sample size (no. of
firms / firm-year observations)
Sample Source Sample
period
Sample geographical
focus
Prior
et al.
2008 + 593 / 1105 SiRi Pro™ database; COMPUSTAT Global
Vantage database
2002–2004 International (26
countries)
Chih
et al.
2008 + and –
(dependent on
type of EM)
1653 / undisclosed FTSE All-World Developed Index (Global);
FTSE4Good Global Index; COMPUSTAT
Global Vantage database
1993–2002 International (46
countries)
Gargouri
et al.
2010 + 109 / 180 Michael Jantzi Research Associates
Canadian Social Investment Database
2004–2005 National (Canada)
Barton
et al.
2010 + 1317 / 7902 Kinder, Lydenburg, and Domini;
COMPUSTAT Global Vantage database
2003–2008 National (United States)
Kim
et al.
2012 +/− Undisclosed / 18,160 Kinder, Lydenburg, and Domini,
COMPUSTAT Global Vantage database
1991–2009 National (United States)
Salewski
and
Zülch
2014 + 90 / 258 Kirchhoff Consult AG Good Company
Ranking
2005–2009 International (Europe;
mainly Germany, France,
United Kingdom)
Gao and
Zang
2015 – 2022 / 10,755 Kinder, Lydenburg, and Domini,
COMPUSTAT Global Vantage database
1993–2010 National (United States)
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(including income smoothing), certain types of stake-
holders (employees and customers), and for regulated
sectors.
While research by Gargouri et al. (2010) among 109
Canadian firms also point at a positive association be-
tween CSR – especially in the realms of environment
and employees – and EM practices, Chih et al. (2008)
largely arrive at a different conclusion on the EM-CSR
relationship. They investigated whether CSR mitigates or
increases the extent of EM by looking at income
smoothing, earnings aggressiveness (i.e., the tendency to
delay loss recognition and accelerate gains recognition;
cf. Bhattacharya et al., 2003), and the avoidance of earn-
ings losses and decreases. Using data from 1653 firms in
46 countries, the authors conclude that “a firm with CSR
in mind tends not to smooth earnings, and displays less
interest in avoiding earnings losses and decreases. It is,
however, prone to engage in more earnings aggressive-
ness” (Chih et al. 2008: 195–196). This opportunistic
tendency, the authors argue, may be lessened in coun-
tries with strong legal enforcement.
Such opportunistic tendencies by firms can also be
found in the research by Salewski and Zülch (2014).
Acknowledging the mixed results of prior research, these
authors have empirically explored the relationship be-
tween CSR and the degree of EM, the degree of account-
ing conservatism and accruals quality among European
blue chip firms. Contrasting Chih et al. (2008) their find-
ings show high-CSR firms to be more likely to engage in
EM, to have lower quality accruals and to report bad
financial news less timely. Based on the geography of
their sample, the authors hence contend that geograph-
ical characteristics moderate the EM-CSR relationship.
In line with Chih et al. (2008), Kim et al. (2012) con-
clude that socially responsible firms are less likely to
engage in earnings management and to manipulate real
operating activities than other firms. Using the KLD
database, they suggest that ethical concerns are likely to
encourage managers to produce high-quality financial
disclosures and restrain them from practising EM.
Based on a sample of 2022 firms and 10,755 firm-year
observations for the period 1993–2010, Gao and Zang
(2015) recently found a negative correlation between
CSR and earnings smoothness, suggesting that socially
responsible firms reduce or avoid EM through discre-
tionary smoothing. Income-smoothing CSR-oriented
firms also appear to experience higher earnings-return
relationships and stronger current return-future earnings
relationships. Their results indicate that CSR adds a
‘quality dimension’ to EM.
The results from research by Barton et al. (2010) into
the earnings management choices of ethical firms indi-
cates a more nuanced view on the EM-CSR relationship.
Using several proxies of CSR and EM, including
abnormal levels of accruals, cash flows, inventory pro-
duction, and discretionary expenses, they find that eth-
ical firms, alike regular firms, manage earnings.
However, ethical firms do so primarily through real ac-
tions rather than accounting choices, and with the objec-
tives of meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts and
reducing financing and tax costs, rather than opportun-
istically increasing management’s compensation or
equity stakes. Barton et al.’s findings suggest that
whether firms view EM as ethical depends on the man-
ner and reasons for managing earnings. CSR-oriented
firms legitimize EM through using real actions rather
than accounting choices, but apparently only to increase
shareholders’ rather than managers’ wealth.
Related research
Research on the EM-CSR relationship has not only been
conducted from the perspective of ethical firms, but also
on related categories. Focusing on firms with poor envir-
onmental ratings, a study by Sarumpaet (2012) based on
577 observations from listed Indonesian firms showed
such firms to engage in EM. These firms were presumed
to decrease their earnings to anticipate and avoid polit-
ical costs in the context of a pollution control, evalu-
ation and rating program by the authorities.
Scholars have been studying EM and sustainability
reporting practices as well. Focusing on environmental
disclosures of 245 UK firms, Sun et al. (2010) find no
statistically significant association, suggesting that British
managers do not use environmental disclosure to reduce
the chance that public policy actions is taken against
their firms (Sun et al. 2010; cf. Patten and Trompeter,
2003). Their research however found audit committee
diligence to affect the relationship between EM and
corporate environmental disclosure.
Yip et al. (2011) examined whether CSR disclosure is
related to EM and if the relationship is mitigated by pol-
itical cost considerations or by the firm’s ethical predis-
position. Using data from the US oil and gas industry
and the food industry (which score relatively high and
low in the level of political attention respectively), they
observe a significant relationship between CSR reporting
and EM and, more specifically, evidence of a negative
(complementary) relationship in the former industry
while a positive (substitutive) relationship in the latter.
Their findings hence suggest that the relationship be-
tween CSR reporting and EM is context-specific,
affected by the political environment instead of ethical
considerations.
The relationship between CSR and EM has also been
investigated from other, more indirect, angles. Various
authors (e.g., Beltratti 2005; Jo and Harjoto 2011) have
studied the relationship between corporate governance
and CSR, concluding that firms with good corporate
Moratis and van Egmond International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility  (2018) 3:8 Page 4 of 13
governance systems in place may be more likely to pro-
tect the interests of external constituents, including in
instances where a firm’s action are legal, but inappropri-
ate. This corroborates the work of Dechow et al. (1996)
who found that a positive relation exists between cor-
porate governance and earnings quality, indicating lower
EM probability.
Yet other views on the EM-CSR relationship have
been emerging. Lys et al. (2015) have recently demon-
strated empirically that firms’ CSR expenditures should
be seen as a signalling strategy: firms undertake CSR
expenditures in the current period when they anticipate
stronger future financial performance, thus signalling
their financial performance through CSR. They conclude
that CSR disclosures are another channel by which firms
convey private information to outsiders. While Lys et al.
(2015) do not focus on the EM-CSR relationship, their
study suggests that CSR is a strategic investment for
firms to signal future earnings towards investors.
Chakravarthy et al. (2014), as a final illustration, suggest
that CSR can help repair reputational damage that is the
result of earnings restatements by firms.
Industry effects
While EM has appeared to be dependent on firm char-
acteristics such as the type and ownership of firms and
firm size (Siregar and Utama 2008), there has not been
much attention for industry effects on EM. Dechow
et al. (1995) have found extents of EM to correlate
between firms in the same industries and various re-
searchers have explored industry effects comparing core
and peripheral sectors (Belkaoui and Picur 1984;
Albrecht and Richardson 1990; Kinnunen et al. 1995).
Many researchers have investigated CSR from the per-
spective of particular sectors or industries (e.g., Wagner
et al. 2002; Cuganesan et al. 2010) and studying industry
effects is a widely adopted practice in CSR research (e.g.,
Young and Marais 2012; Melo and Garrido-Morgado
2011). Specifically, varying industry levels of stakeholder
activism and stakeholder interest in CSR appear to influ-
ence the relationship between firms’ CSR and financial
performance (Chand and Fraser 2006). Firms have also
been found to change their sustainability disclosures due
to increased stakeholder awareness and pressure. Hrasky
(2011) found that less carbon-intensive sectors move
towards symbolic disclosure strategies, while more
carbon-intensive sectors shift towards behavioral disclos-
ure strategies.
Looking at the EM-CSR relationship, Yip et al. (2011)
have studied industry effects by comparing the oil & gas
and the food industry as illustrations of sectors that are
experiencing different levels of political attention. How-
ever, these authors legitimize their choice by claiming that
the food industry has attracted much less political
attention than the oil & gas industry, which – at least in
some national contexts (e.g., China, the Netherlands) – is
not necessarily the case. Also, one could question to what
extent political attention (attention with the prospect of,
for instance, higher taxes or increased regulation) is a suf-
ficiently appropriate proxy for CSR. A sector operationali-
zation such as made by Hrasky (2011), based on assumed
negative environmental impacts, hence seems more suit-
able when researching industry effects in the EM-CSR re-
lationship and is used in this study.
In the next section, we will elaborate on the research
methodology, which contains descriptions of the control
variables used in the models.
Research methodology
The following paragraphs expound on the methodology
used to determine the degree of EM, CSR performance,
and industry effects as well as on the model developed,
including the control variables, to explore the EM-CSR
relationship.
Measuring the degree of EM
This study uses accrual-based EM to investigate the
EM-CSR relationship. Discretionary accruals reveal the
degree of bias infused into financial statements by firms
(Hoitash et al. 2007).3 The degree of EM will be deter-
mined by the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al.
1995), assuming that all changes in credit sales during a
sample period are the result of EM. This assumption is
based on the notion that EM is easier to exercise over
recognition of revenue from credit sales than from cash
sales. As the Modified Jones model has proven powerful
in detecting EM it has been regularly used in studies
that aim to discover earnings quality (e.g., Gul et al.
2003; Hoitash et al. 2007; Velury 2003).
Total accruals is calculated as follows:
TAt ¼ EXBIt−CFOt
Where:
TAt = Total Accruals (in year t)
EXBIt = Income Before Extraordinary Items (in year t)
CFOt = Cash Flows from Operations (in year t)
The following equation was used in order to estimate
the parameters to find the amount of non-discretionary
accruals:
TAt ¼ β1; t 1=At−1½  þ β2; t ΔREVt=At−1½ 
þ β3; t ΔPPEt=At−1½  þ ε
Where:
At − 1 = Assets (in year t − 1)
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ΔREVt = Change in Revenue (year t – 1 to year t)
ΔPPEt = Change gross property, plant and equipment
(year t – 1 to year t)
βt = Parameters
ε = Error of Estimate
Non-discretionary accruals were found by using the
equation:
NAt ¼ β1; t 1=At−1½  þ β2; t ΔREVt−ΔRECt=At−1½ 
þ β3; t ΔPPEt=At−1½  þ ε
Where:
ΔRECt = Change in Receivables (year t – 1 to year t)
Discretionary accruals are calculated by subtracting
non-discretionary accruals from total accruals:
DAt ¼ TAt−NAt
Where:
DAt = Discretionary Accruals (in year t)
NAt = Non discretionary Accruals (in year t)
Measuring CSR performance
The KLD database was used to measure firms’ CSR per-
formance. This database, containing information on vari-
ous dimensions of CSR about US companies, has been
used in various research papers to measure CSR (e.g.,
Kim et al. 2012; Turban and Greening 1997). It is con-
sidered to be factual, reliable, broad-ranging, and main-
tained with consistency and transparency (Waddock
2003; Mattingly and Berman 2006) and has proven to re-
flect firms’ actual CSR performance (Chatterji et al.
2009; Rahman and Post 2012).
This study differentiates between the firm-level per-
formance labels CSR positive, neutral and negative
through measuring the score on various CSR strengths
and concerns of firms on seven different categories
(community, corporate governance, diversity, employee
relations, environment, human rights, product) that
evaluate firms’ stakeholder responsiveness. Strengths and
concerns cover approximately 80 indicators in these cat-
egories (Table 2). The KLD database captures firms’
responsiveness towards various different stakeholder
groups (consumers, employees, the community,
diversity-related stakeholders, environmental action
groups) and hence spans a wide range of CSR topics. In
line with Kim et al. (2012) CSR performance was mea-
sured by taking the total of strengths in the seven
categories and subtracting the total of concerns from
them, leading to firms that are labelled CSR positive,
CSR neutral or CSR negative.
Measuring industry effects
In order to measure industry effects, a distinction was
made between industries based on 2-digit Standard In-
dustrial Classification (SIC) codes from the COMPU-
STAT database (cf. Kim et al. 2012). As stakeholders are
becoming more aware of CSR topics and are increasingly
pressuring industries to be socially responsible (Hrasky
2011), firms that are active in industries that are per-
ceived to have a negative effect on the environment were
assumed to face higher pressure for CSR and to minima-
lize their environmental impacts. Research by Oekom
Table 2 Strengths and concerns in KLD categories (based on Bird et al. (2007))
Category Strengths… Concerns…
Community … measure various contributions that the company makes to the
community such as charitable contributions and support for the
disadvantaged.
,,, measure activities that are judged to have had a negative
economic impact on the community and/or possibly mobilized
community opposition.
Corporate
governance
… are present when activities such as limited compensation for
the management and the company has multiple ownership
strengths.
… are present when managers receive high compensation and
there is low reporting quality.
Diversity … measure the activities of the company in such areas as
providing employment opportunities for minorities and providing
working conditions that meet the special needs of minorities.
… measure things like the non-representation of minorities in
senior positions within the company and major controversies on
affirmative action issues.
Employee
relations
… are practice such as strong worker involvement within the
company, generous profit sharing across the majority of
employees, good retirement benefits and/or a good safety record.
… arise when ac company might have bad union’s relations, a
poor safety record and/or a poorly funded pension plan.
Environment … are a result when a company performs environmentally sound
practices such as pollution prevention, and recycling.
… will arise when practices such as producing hazardous waste
and/or environmentally unfriendly products are present.
Human
rights
… are present when the company has a set of high quality of
labor rights or follows human right policies imposed by society.
… are measured by activities such as support for controversial
regimes and low quality labor rights.
Products … measure activities such as high product quality, high
innovation and the development of products to meet the special
needs of the disadvantaged.
… are present when the company has low product safety,
controversies over how it advertises its products and other
product-related community concerns.
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research (2009) suggests that such industries generally
achieve good ratings in terms of their reports on envir-
onmental and social impacts. For purposes of regression
analysis a dummy variable was included to differentiate
between high environmental impact and low environ-
mental impact industries. To distinguish between two
industries classifications, dummy variables ‘one’ and
‘zero’ were created with ‘one’ linked to industries that
have a large impact on the environment and ‘zero’ to in-
dustries that have a smaller impact on the environment
(Table 3).
Model
As there are potentially multiple factors influencing the
EM-CSR relationship management and the effects of in-
dustry type (INDUS), several control variables were
included. The first control variable is firm size (SIZE),
which is measured by taking the natural log of total assets.
There are different views on the effect of firm size on EM.
Capital market pressures are greater for larger firms, be-
cause their performance is the focus of the analyst com-
munity. This incentivizes firms to adopt more aggressive
accounting policies, including EM (Richardson et al.
2002). The opposite view is that firm size can be used as a
proxy for information asymmetry. Larger firms generally
are more closely scrutinized by outsiders and required to
disclose information, hence having a lower EM probabil-
ity. Small firms, however are able to conceal private infor-
mation more easily (Lee and Choi 2002). It can thus be
suggested that firm size may explain significant variations
in EM (Roychowdhury 2006). Next to the effect of firm
size on EM, studies also show that firm size is correlated
with CSR performance (McWilliams and Siegel 2000;
Prior et al. 2008; Waddock 2003).
Return on assets (ROA) will be used to control for
firm profitability and performance (cf. Kim et al. 2012;
Prior et al. 2008). While Cochran and Wood (1984) ob-
served a correlation between CSR and firms’ financial
performance, Dechow et al. (1995) and Orlitzky et al.
(2003) contend that measures such as ROA are sensitive
to manipulation by the management of the firm. Man-
agers can make use of real and accrual-based EM to
positively affect ROA.
Market-to-book (MTB) ratio is used to measure the
market perception of firms’ future growth. Literature sug-
gests that growth stocks are particularly sensitive to stock
price and that the market reacts negatively to firms that
break their string of consecutive earnings increases (Barth
et al. 1999; Skinner and Sloan 2002). Therefore, MTB
explains whether a firm is under great pressure to adopt
aggressive accounting policies to increase earnings.
Sales growth (GROWTH) is measured as firms’ in-
crease in sales divided by its sales in the previous year.
Firms that experience strong growth are subject to more
media attention. When firms are under such scrutiny,
there is a higher EM probability (Lee and Choi 2002).
Leverage (LEV) captures the impact of debt contract-
ing on EM. The relationship between EM and leverage
is subject to two posing empirical findings. Sweeney
(1994) and Press and Weintrop (1990) suggested that
high leverage firms tend engage in aggressive EM. They
find that firms respond to debt contracting by reporting
discretionary accruals (Becker et al. 1998; Richardson
et al. 2002). In contrast, Dechow and Skinner (2000) re-
port that firms with high leverage are less likely to report
small earnings increases. Chung and Kallapur (2003) do
not find a relation between abnormal accruals and lever-
age at all, suggesting that the relation between leverage
and EM is uncertain.
A similar study by Kim et al. (2012) used R&D inten-
sity (R&D) as a control variable, measuring R&D ex-
pense by net sales. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) argued
that R&D investment and CSR are correlated, because
both are associated with product and process innovation.
Any equation including CSR performance should there-
fore control for upwardly biased estimates of CSR per-
formance by including a variable for R&D investments.
Auditor size (BIG4) will be used as control variable
through a dummy variable. Large auditing offices can
draw on expertise of their international network that will
result in higher audit quality (Carson 2009; Francis and
Wang 2008). Research indicates that Big-4 auditors pos-
sess more reputational incentives than smaller auditors
and thus are less inclined to impair their independence
for one client (Francis 2004). Becker et al. (1998) studied
differences between firms being audited by the biggest
audit offices and smaller audit offices in the context of
EM, finding that smaller offices report discretionary
Table 3 Classification of industries
Sectors SIC codes
High environmental impact
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 01–09
Mining 10–14
Construction 15–17
Manufacturing 20–39
Transportation & Public utilities 40–49
Low environmental impact
Telecommunication 48
Wholesale trade 50–51
Retail trade 52–59
Financials, Insurance, Real Estate 60–67
Services 70–89
Public administration 91–99
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accruals that as a percentage of total assets are on aver-
age 1.5 to 2.1% higher than the discretionary accruals re-
ported by clients of large auditing firms.
The following models (Model I and Model II) were
used to test the EM-CSR relationship:
EM ¼ αþ β1 CSRþ β2 INDUS þ β3 SIC
þ β3 SIZE þ β4 ROAþ β5 LEV
þ β6 GROWTH þ β7MTBþ β8 RD
þ β9 BIG4þ ε
and
CSR ¼ αþ β1 EM þ β2 INDUS þ β3 SIC
þ β3 SIZE þ β4 ROAþ β5 LEV
þ β6 GROWTH þ β7MTBþ β8 RD
þ β9 BIG4þ ε
Where:
EM = Earnings management
CSR = CSR performance
SIC = Standard Industrial Classification code
INDUS = Dummy variable ‘one’ for CSR extensive
industries, otherwise ‘zero’
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets
ROA = Return on assets (net income divided by total
assets)
LEV = Total debt divided by total assets
GROWTH = Sales growth, divided by sales previous year
MTB =Market-to-book equity ratio (market value of
equity divided by the book value of equity)
R&D = R&D expense divided by the net sales
BIG4 = Dummy variable ‘one’ if audited by Big 4 audit
firm, otherwise ‘zero’
Sample
The sample included US-based firms only to ensure that
firms operated the same economic and political environ-
ment and includes observations from the fiscal years
2003–2009, thus after the creation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOx) of 2002, since SOx has had a significant
effect on accrual-based EM (Cohen et al. 2008). Further-
more, most data collected through the KLD database go
only as far as 2009.
The merged dataset contained over 11,000 firm-year
observations. We corrected this dataset for missing
values by excluding cases listwise, resulting in a reduc-
tion of the sample to 6567 observations. The frequencies
of all variables were checked through a frequency test,
leading to no exceptional frequencies except for the vari-
able R&D. As a result of this cumulating of data an add-
itional 968 observations were deleted. Finally, 105
outliers were deleted, resulting in a final sample of 5494
observations.
Results
The following paragraphs provide the results of our
study, addressing descriptive statistics, regression ana-
lyses and robustness respectively.
Descriptive statistics
Nearly 80% (78.94%) of the researched sample were ob-
servations from five industries: chemicals and allied
products; industrial and commercial machinery and
computer equipment; electronic and other electrical
equipment and components, except computer equip-
ment; measuring, analysing, and controlling instrument;
and business services.
Table 4 provides an overview of all independent vari-
ables used in the two research models.4 Discretionary
accruals (DISCR) have a mean of 0.0786636 million,
resulting from converting all negative discretionary
accruals into positive. CSR performance shows a nega-
tive mean (− 0.3896979), indicating that firms included
in the sample overall possess more CSR concerns than
CSR strengths. The industry variable (0.9056061) indi-
cates that most observations fall in industries belong-
ing to high environmental impact industries. This can
be explained by four out of the five dominant indus-
tries in the sample falling into this group, which is
caused by the fact that most firms in the KLD data-
base are listed in the S&P 500. This also causes the
high number (6.863589) of the log of total assets.
GROWTH shows a negative mean (− 0.0631989) and
ROA shows a number below 1 % (0.0042784), which
is probably explained by the effect of the economic
downturn in the latter years of the sample period.
The average leverage ratio has a value of around 0.5, indi-
cating that, on average, firms have two times the amount
of assets compared to debt. The mean of market-to-book
ratio (3.427874) indicates that most firms are undervalued,
while the R&D intensity (0.2625014) indicates that firms
spend around a quarter of their sales on R&D. The mean
Table 4 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
EM .0786636 .1380935 4.95e-06 4.001645
CSR −.3896979 2.289873 −9 13
SIC 40.52876 16.04184 10 87
INDUS .8056061 .3957694 0 1
SIZE 6.863589 1.681489 1.600599 13.08138
ROA .0042784 .2197204 −7.582123 1.617011
LEV .4469656 .2730597 .0211989 3.564619
GROWTH −.0631989 .3497316 −1 10.58722
MTB 3.427874 4.415615 −44.39538 50.38522
RD .2625014 .8740478 .0001433 10.60547
BIG4 .9339279 .2484307 0 1
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of the BIG4 dummy (0.9339279) shows that the sample is
primarily audited by one of the large audit firms.
Table 5 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for all
variables. The results indicate a negligible (and insignifi-
cant) correlation between CSR and EM. The same goes
for the correlation between EM and INDUS. The other
variables are weakly correlated at best (e.g., SIZE), but
mostly show negligible correlation factors..
To account for issues of multicollinearity (Gujarati,
1988) a variable inflation factor (VIF) test was performed
for CSR and EM since this correlation in particular di-
minishes the power of an eventual relation. No VIF
values of 10 or above were found, indicating that a linear
combination is not probable.5 In addition, a skewness
and kurtosis test were conducted to test the symmetry
of the data distribution, indicating that data were nor-
mally distributed.
Regression analyses
The results of the regression analyses of Model I and
Model II are presented in Tables 6 and 7.
The low coefficient values in Model I indicate that it
lacks explanatory power. While the model shows a posi-
tive relation between CSR and EM, it is not statistically
significant. Since the SIC variables do have a significant
relation with EM, the model indicates that industry in-
fluences EM. The variable INDUS however shows a
negative relation with EM. This indicates that firms in
industries that have a high environmental impact prac-
tice EM to a lesser extent than those in industries that
have a lower environmental impact.
The regression analysis for Model II shows that the ex-
planatory power of this model is also low, suggesting
that there is no significant relationship between EM and
CSR. The significance of the SIC variable suggests that
the industry a firm is in has an effect on the level of CSR
performance. The variable INDUS shows that firms that
belong to industries that have a high environmental im-
pact have higher levels of CSR performance.
Robustness check
A robustness check was performed to check the robust-
ness of the results of the ordinary least square regression
(see Table 8). The results for Model I show that almost
all variables that were significant remained significant
and that the effect of CSR on EM remained insignificant.
Almost all variables showed a minor change in their co-
efficients and showed a smaller effect on EM than in the
regression analysis, either positively or negatively. Only
the variable R&D changed from having a positive effect
on earnings management to a negative effect.
The robustness check performed for Model II (see
Table 9) also shows virtually no change in coefficients
and p-values. Here, too, the effect of all variables except
for R&D on EM decreases. Furthermore, this robustness
check shows an even higher p-value for the effect of EM
on CSR performance, indicating that a relationship is
even more improbable.
Conclusion and discussion
This article investigated the relationship between CSR
and earnings management and the effect of high versus
low environmental impact industry on this relationship.
As the limited prior research on the EM-CSR relation-
ship has shown mixed results and has largely neglected
the effect of industry type (especially as operationalized
in this article through distinguishing between industries
with high and low environmental impacts (cf. Hrasky
2011)), we aimed to contribute to insights in this field
with our study. Using the Modified Jones model
(Dechow et al. 1995) to analyze data from the KLD data-
base for US firms in the period 2002–2009, we found a
positive though statistically insignificant relationship be-
tween EM and CSR. The results from our study suggest
Table 5 Pearson correlation matrix
Variable EM CSR SIC INDUS ROA SIZE GROWTH LEV MTB RD BIG4
EM 1.0000
CSR − 0.0057 1.0000
INDUS 0.0258* 0.1148*** 1.0000
SIC − 0.0387*** − 0.0912*** − 0.9367*** 1.0000
SIZE − 0.1917*** 0.0923*** − 0.1885*** 0.1292*** 1.0000
ROA − 0.2125*** 0.0501*** 0.0410*** − 0.0308** 0.2459*** 1.0000
LEV 0.0274** − 0.0694*** − 0.1587*** 0.0781*** 0.3360*** −0.1944*** 1.0000
GROWTH − 0.0615*** − 0.0293** − 0.0512*** 0.0536*** 0.0046 − 0.1049*** 0.0289** 1.0000
MTB 0.0708*** 0.0790*** 0.0249* − 0.0483*** − 0.0625*** 0.0588*** − 0.0142 − 0.0678*** 1.0000
RD 0.1398*** 0.0061 − 0.0924*** 0.0590*** − 0.2222*** − 0.4346*** 0.0464*** 0.0884*** 0.0667*** 1.0000
BIG4 − 0.0623*** 0.0293** 0.0445*** 0.0378*** 0.2319*** 0.0010 0.1148*** − 0.0208 − 0.0097 0.0117 1.0000
* Significant at p < 0.10; ** Significant at p < 0.05; *** Significant at p < 0.01
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that while firms in industries that have a high environ-
mental impact tend to have higher levels of CSR per-
formance, these firms practice EM to a lesser extent
than firms in industries that have a lower environmental
impact (cf. Chih et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2012). It may not
come as a surprise that firms in industries that have
higher environmental impacts have higher levels of CSR
performance, since these firms are probably aiming to
counter or compensate for their negative externalities,
either in an environmental or in a social way. As such,
these CSR-oriented firms may not display opportunistic
behaviour from an EM perspective (Chih et al. 2008;
Salewski and Zülch, 2014), but may be more opportunis-
tic from a CSR perspective. However, it may be a some-
what surprising result of this study that firms in high
impact industries seem to have a lower tendency to-
wards EM in the sense that they may not be using CSR
initiatives to deflect stakeholders’ attention from
practices aimed at creating an overly positive image of
their financial situation. This study may thus prompt the
idea that the so-called ‘obfuscation hypothesis’ (i.e., CSR
being an ideal way for deflecting stakeholders’ attention
for EM (Prior et al. 2008)) may not or only to a minor
extent hold for companies with high environmental
impacts. As such, these findings seem to contradict lit-
erature in the field of CSR (e.g., Delmas and Cuerel
Burbano 2011; Elving, 2012; Illia et al., 2013). Also, from
a more speculative perspective, one may argue based on
our findings that firms could be considering CSR as a
superior strategy compared to EM in order to obfuscate
their true financial quality (cf. Courtis, 1998; Rutherford,
2003).
Limitations and research suggestions
Our study is obviously subject to several limitations.
First, by measuring EM through accrual EM instead of
real EM, this study is not able to capture the total pic-
ture of EM. This may have influenced the relationship
Table 8 Robustness check for Model I (EM)
EM = α + β1CSR + β2INDUS + β3SIZE + β4ROA + β5LEV
+ β6GROWTH + β7MTB + β8R &D + β9BIG4 + ε
Variable Coefficient T P-value
CSR .0002908 1.05 0.292
SIC −.0004179 −3.60 0.000
INDUS −.0218191 −4.74 0.000
SIZE −.0043168 −9.74 0.000
ROA −.0706568 −18.78 0.000
LEV .0044265 1.72 0.085
GROWTH −.0058265 −3.26 0.001
MTB .0008143 5.73 0.000
RD −.0033122 −4.08 0.000
BIG4 −.0091071 −3.54 0.000
Table 9 Robustness check for Model II (CSR)
CSR = α + β1EM + β2INDUS + β3SIZE + β4ROA + β5LEV
+ β6GROWTH + β7MTB + β8R &D + β9BIG4 + ε
Variable Coefficient T P-value
EM .1256402 0.68 0.495
SIC .0232756 5.10 0.000
INDUS .5019461 2.76 0.006
SIZE .0985869 5.67 0.000
ROA .022396 0.17 0.866
LEV −.6804796 −6.73 0.000
GROWTH −.1251157 −1.77 0.076
MTB .0349716 6.24 0.000
RD .1065307 3.35 0.001
BIG4 .1186333 1.17 0.241
Table 6 Regression results for Model I (EM)
EM = α + β1CSR + β2INDUS + β3SIZE + β4ROA + β5LEV
+ β6GROWTH + β7MTB + β8R &D + β9BIG4 + ε
Adjusted R-squared = 0.0812
Variable Coefficient T P-value
CSR .0009125 1.14 0.254
SIC −.0009392 −2.79 0.005
INDUS −.0425261 −3.19 0.001
SIZE −.0126608 −9.90 0.000
ROA −.1023971 −10.64 0.000
LEV .0233651 3.14 0.002
GROWTH −.0305597 −5.92 0.000
MTB .0018528 4.50 0.000
RD .0051949 2.22 0.026
BIG4 −.0187861 −2.53 0.011
Table 7 Regression results for Model II (CSR)
CSR = α + β1EM + β2INDUS + β3SIZE + β4ROA + β5LEV
+ β6GROWTH + β7MTB + β8R &D + β9BIG4 + ε
Adjusted R-squared = 0.0496
Variable Coefficient T P-value
EM .2600322 1.14 0.254
SIC .0435496 7.70 0.000
INDUS 1.046145 4.65 0.000
SIZE .2435294 11.31 0.000
ROA .0462446 0.28 0.778
LEV −.8107081 −6.47 0.000
GROWTH −.1303827 −1.49 0.136
MTB .0430423 6.20 0.000
RD .1670621 4.24 0.000
BIG4 .0579144 0.46 0.644
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found between EM and CSR. Using other methods to
address EM may increase the power of the used statis-
tical models and lead to different results. Indicators such
as income smoothing and earnings aggressiveness and
concepts such as forecast management (Bernhardt and
Campello 2007) and disclosure frequency (Jo and Kim
2007) have been used by other researchers to explore
EM. Scholars may also apply other indicators to estimate
discretionary accruals, such as the DeAngelo model
(DeAngelo, 1988), or may create other models that over-
come the limitations of existing models (Young 1999).
Related to this limitation, Jackson (2017) recently wrote
an extensive critique on discretionary accruals measures,
labelling them “noisy proxies” for EM and noting that
EM may be heavily influenced by the behaviour of peer
firms rather than other independent variables addressed
in EM studies. Taking these issues into account, future
studies on the EM-CSR relationship may choose to de-
ploy other, more precise, indicators for EM and may
shed a different light on this relationship. As an exten-
sion of this point, it should be noted that levels of CSR
performance can also (perhaps by definition) be consid-
ered as noisy proxies. For instance, it should be noted
that CSR initiatives taken by firms, which is the primary
operationalization of CSR performance in most data-
bases, in itself does not mean that firms are actually
reducing their actual negative impacts on society. Also,
in the context of the database used in this study, the use
of non-weighted CSR items, despite the fact that they
represent a wide range of relevant CSR issues (cf. the
definition of CSR adopted in this article), may distort re-
search findings. Weighted CSR items may lead to a more
diverse and balanced view of CSR performance, espe-
cially when the EM-CSR relationship is researched in
other geographical contexts.
A second obvious limitation of our study is that it only
includes observations of US listed companies, diminish-
ing the potential to generalize the results of this study
since differences of the national environments were not
tested. Investigating the EM-CSR relationship for firms
in other countries could well result in other findings. It
has been argued that the ‘CSR national systems’ in Euro-
pean countries differ from that in the US from the per-
spective of the political, legal, cultural, financial, and
coordination and control systems (Matten and Moon
2008). These differences can both have an effect on EM
and CSR and hence lead to other insights in the EM-
CSR relationship (cf. Salewski and Zülch, 2014). Extend-
ing this limitation to a research suggestion, it may be
possible to enrich the models used in this article with
one or more variables regarding national legal frame-
works (enabling a between-country comparison) in order
to, for instance, investigate the role of investors’ rights
and interests. Also, framing this issue as a principal-
agent problem, the role of activist shareholders in the
EM-CSR relationship may be considered to be a relevant
area of inquiry to be taken up by researchers.
A third limitation applies to the industry categorization.
Other separation methods to measure the effect of the
industry can be used to research the EM-CSR relationship.
Disclosure patterns differ from one industry type to an-
other (Akhtaruddin, 2005). Further, the models do not
consider all possibilities of all variables that can influence
the relation between CSR and EM (cf. Jackson 2017).
Therefore, future research may add other elements that
can moderate the causal links between the variables.
Other contingencies may be included in future studies as
well. For instance, research has shown that firms with a
higher proportion of non-executive directors appear to
have lower earnings management (Klein, 2002). Also, the
quality and extent of financial disclosure (Chen and Jaggi,
2000), disclosure frequency (Jo and Kim 2007), and other
governance attributes, including board diversity and gen-
der composition (Bear et al. 2010) may be addressed in
research on the EM-CSR relationship.
Endnotes
1The authors would like to express their gratitude for
the valuable responses of two anonymous reviewers.
These responses have added greatly to the quality of this
paper.
2Since it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a
full account of causes and consequences of EM, we refer
to the authorative work of Dechow et al. (1995).
3It should be noted that this study does not differenti-
ate between positive or negative discretionary accruals.
All negative discretionary accruals were made positive so
that only the amount rather than the direction of the ac-
cruals are taken into account.
4The sample size of the different variables is the same,
because observation with one or more missing variables
were deleted from the sample.
5High VIF values of the SIC and INDUS variables
(9.13 / 9.05 and 8.75 / 8.74 for the EM / CSR model)
were obviously caused by the fact that INDUS originates
from SIC.
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